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South African NGOs and the public sphere: Between popular movements and 
partnerships for development 
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This article examines the widespread notion that post-apartheid democracy can be 
deepened and civil society strengthened by NGO activities in the sphere of public debate 
and participation. I focus on a number of interrelated processes which I argue may 
compromise NGOs’ ability to expand the public sphere: firstly, donors’ overwhelming 
focus on NGOs as the sole representative of civil society may contribute to a 
homogenous and institutionalised public sphere; secondly, the tendency for NGOs to be 
drawn into partnerships with government bodies and corporate sponsors casts doubt on 
their ability to open up spaces for critical public debate. By directing attention to popular 
movements as potentially offering a site for the production of critique, NGOs’ 
relationships to such movements are examined. It is argued that attention must be paid to 
the processes of NGO-isation and reformism by which NGOs themselves come to define 
what civil society should be and may consequently contain counterpublic spheres. 
 
 




There are a number of South African non-governmental organisations (NGOs) whose 
objectives include enhancing public debate and participation and building civil society 
capacity. Generally donor-funded, the activities of such NGOs are understood as 
deepening democracy and supporting a healthy civil society. This article seeks to assess 
claims about the role of NGOs in the public sphere: does their work open up the sphere of 
debate and critique or are their endeavours by definition elitist, excluding the experiences 
and socio-economic realities of the majority population? A number of interrelated 
processes are charted by which certain actors are included and others excluded in 
conceptions of civil society in South Africa. This, it is argued, may in fact impact 
negatively on the existence of spaces of public deliberation and on the shape of post-
apartheid democracy. The article thus seeks to contribute to a critical reading of 
formalised South African NGOs and their relationships with other components of civil 
society. In the first part, I examine how particular donor understandings of civil society, 
chiefly its conflation with professionalised NGOs, contribute to a limited definition of 
civil society in post-apartheid South Africa. In the second part, reconceptualisations of 
public-sphere theory are employed in order to direct attention to popular movements and 
their potential to open up spaces for critique NGOs may structurally be unable to engage 
in. In examining the relationships of formalised NGOs to social movements, I argue that 
processes of NGO-isation as well as NGOs’ own ‘reformism’ of civil society may 
contribute to a narrowing of spaces for public debate. 
The organisations sampled for this research are what I refer to as intermediary 
NGOs. Unlike pure service-delivery NGOs, the work of such formalised organisations 
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seeks to promote and extend democracy through capacity building, research, advocacy, 
monitoring and organisational development. Given their heterogeneity, it is not possible 
to give adequate space to the political and organisational differences between the NGOs 
considered here; what this article focuses on are the processes by which NGOs may come 
to represent civil society in South Africa.i 
 
Civil society, donors and post-apartheid democracy: What role(s) for NGOs? 
 
Theoretical perspectives on civil society and public sphere 
South African political scientist Adam Habib characterises civil society as ‘the organised 
expression of various interests and values operating in the triangular space between the 
family, state and the market’ (2003, p. 228).ii The term has plural and often contradictory 
meanings for different civil society actors: many of those interviewed rejected it outright 
as a donor discourse, some saw it as an ambivalent category with limited use, and others 
employed the term strategically. Yet, the notion of civil society is perpetually evoked in 
the language of donors and international institutions. From its revival in the 1980s, when 
it was picked up by the development mainstream, resulted a huge extension of civil 
society support programmes; by the end of the decade, a new orthodoxy had evolved 
which discredited the state as at best inefficient. Civil society was hailed as a benign area 
through which to improve the democratic performance of governments in the developing 
world, with NGOs identified as primary agents of this vision. 
Turning first to mainstream approaches of civil society, it is perhaps Robert 
Putnam’s (1993, 1995) interpretation that has been most influential on institutional civil 
society discourse in the last two decades. Putnam’s approach builds on Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s work on early American democracy in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Here, civil society is understood as the sum of voluntary organisations. The 
strength and stability of liberal democracy depends on a vibrant sphere of such 
associational participation as a means of ensuring equality and protecting the individual 
from conformity to the will of enfranchised masses (Howell and Pearce 2001). This 
approach to civil society is embedded in liberal democracy, placing great emphasis on 
political stability and the safeguarding of individual interests. Despite the fact that 
Putnam’s work was specifically concerned with democratisation processes in Italy and 
associational life in the US, the revived notion of civil society was adopted as global 
development consensus. Assumptions that it can be transposed to any given political, 
economic or cultural context were justified by an appeal to the universality of (neo)liberal 
democracy. By the mid-1990s, the term had become a fixture in debates on South 
Africa’s democratic future as well. This was not least due to the influx of international 
development funding and knowledge into the country in the period between 1990 and 
1994, during which global policy discourses such as ‘good governance’ and ‘civil 
society’ were adopted and circulated by national NGOs (Pieterse 1997).  
Other theoretical approaches can be traced back to a Gramscian conception of 
state and civil society, the latter a site where hegemony and counter-hegemony are played 
out. Such a framework allows accounting both for NGOs as articulated with the consent 
and legitimating functions of the state and for potentially more progressive movements 
seeking to carve out counter-hegemonic spaces. Jürgen Habermas (1987) argues that the 
‘colonization of the lifeworld’, for example through commercialisation and 
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commodification of media or education, reduces the public sphere by bureaucratising and 
commodifying social life and replacing open dialogue by bureaucratic procedures and 
economic transactions. However, this process also gives rise to new social movements 
which can then construct relatively autonomous spaces for public debate about the 
legitimacy of the political and economic system: ‘Civil society is composed of those 
more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations and movements that, 
attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distil and transmit 
such reactions in amplified forms to the public sphere’ (Habermas 1996 cited  Chambers 
2002, p.96). In Habermas’s account, social movements are thus identified as the principal 
actors for resistance and emancipation, responsible for generating and extending the 
public sphere in democratic systems. From this perspective, civil society provides a site 
for the ‘production and circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the 
state’ and of the goals and values of governance (Fraser 2003, p. 84). His arguments 
further reveal how economic rationalities come to dominate other rationalities in the 
public sphere – a point which I believe can be applied to the commercialisation of NGOs 
discussed below and challenges an orthodox understanding of NGOs as necessarily 
strengthening democracy.  
Some claim that the heyday of civil society discourse is ‘passé’ (Edwards 2004b), 
but this is certainly not backed up by an analysis of recent donor requirements and 
institutional policy texts, nor was it reflected in the interviews for this study. The link 
between civil society and democracy is frequently framed in terms of active citizenship, 
participation and debate – language immediately reminiscent of public-sphere theories. 
Donor-funded civil society projects in South Africa sometimes address the subject of the 
public sphere directly, arguing for instance that ‘civil society must be able to participate 
in and influence public debate’, thus advancing the democratisation process (Böll 
Foundation 2007). The funding guidelines of other donors similarly assume linkages 
between democratic civil societies and increased participation in public affairs.iii 
Accordingly, many formalised intermediary NGOs are involved in related activities: 
organisations as diverse as the Wolpe Trust, the Centre for Public Participation, Media 
Monitoring Africa and Agenda held grants for projects seeking to facilitate public 
dialogue and foster political participation in 2007. Other organisations that focus directly 
or indirectly on building capacity for dialogue and critique include the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI), the 
Edge Institute and the South African History Archive (SAHA), to name but a few.iv  
The construction of civil society in liberal theory as a binary opposite to the state, 
as encountered above, oversimplifies the complex relationships and frequent 
collaboration between state and civil society actors. Habib (2003) distinguishes three 
different sets of civil society organisations (CSOs) which display distinct modes of 
engagement with the South African state: formalised NGOs, social movements and 
survivalist community-based organisations (the latter of which have little, if any, 
interaction with the state). These distinctions are not rigid; social movements such as the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) have taken on characteristics of formalised NGOs, a 
process I discuss in part two of this article, whereas NGOs such as the FXI see their role 
as supporting popular movements.v Nonetheless, the formal NGO sector in particular 
interlinks with the state in a number of ways, for instance through partnerships, through 
subcontracting or through personal histories and political affiliations. It is therefore more 
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apt to speak of a spectrum of relations that are fluid, and contingent on individuals in 
CSOs as well as in the state’s agencies. In order to further elucidate this argument, a brief 
history of CSOs in South Africa, charting the increasing conflation of civil society with 
NGOs, is discussed next.  
 
From civics to NGOs: state-civil society relations in South Africa 
Under apartheid, service organisations were working explicitly against the state, 
providing a shadow welfare system to the majority of the population neglected by the 
state’s separate development policy. Foreign governments and international donor 
agencies channelled funds through these organisations to fight apartheid. Besides the 
objectives of a non-racial democracy, however, the values of the various parts of the anti-
apartheid movement were not always clearly defined and differed on essential issues such 
as the form of democracy and the economic system to be adopted after the end of 
apartheid. Tensions were largely suspended with the formation of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF). This provided an umbrella organisation for hundreds of civics mobilising 
against National Party rule, but clear ideological and organisational divides remained 
among the different components of South African civil society. 
The transition and immediate post-1994 period was mainly characterised by a 
harmonisation of development objectives and co-operation between civil society and the 
newly democratic state. This was the result of a consensual model of nation building in 
the ‘new South Africa’ that attributed a service delivery role to CSOs. The shift, in 1996, 
away from a framework seemingly emphasising reconstruction towards the neoliberal 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan (GEAR) moreover favoured 
‘institutionalised corporatist relationships involving all social forces in the project of 
“nation building” through political/ideological “consensus”’ (McKinley unpublished). 
The adoption of GEAR also marked the increasing exclusion of civil society from 
consultation in policy processes. Structural and legislative changes included the 
establishment of the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO), the National 
Development Agency (NDA) and legislation such as the Non-Profit Act. Many 
organisations folded as a consequence of funding modalities changing towards bilateral 
relations with the ANC government and much of the expertise of the sector being 
absorbed into the new state bureaucracy. Other NGOs survived the funding crisis, but 
found that they needed to reposition themselves either as service-delivery organisations 
or to carry out contracting work for government bodies. As a result of these processes, 
the sector was weakened in terms of capacity, reduced in numbers and increasingly 
dependent in terms of activities, and had restructured itself partly in line with government 
policies and priorities. This transformation and formalisation mirrored the global 
development priorities of institutionalism and inclusion as encapsulated in the Post-
Washington Consensus.vi Civil society effectively became equated with NGOs that had 
successfully professionalised.  
These changes gave rise to what we may call new-generation NGOs. Having 
innovative funding models and a variety of resource mobilisation strategies, such NGOs 
are organisationally configured towards strong partnerships with the public and the 
corporate sector. The partnership mode can be contrasted with NGOs that remain 
structured around a more classical donor-beneficiary model. Clearly, all NGOs are 
currently forced to seek new income-generating strategies and develop self-financing 
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strategies. Also, adherence to monitoring and evaluation standards leads donor-based 
NGOs to corporatise to some extent. The South African NGO sector is highly 
differentiated: ‘new’ NGOs by no means encapsulate the entire NGO sector nor do I 
argue that partnerships have the same impact on all organisations. That said, the model 
that new-generation NGOs are employing has important effects on the whole NGO sector 
in that it renders partnerships as a necessity in the eyes of donors and establishes a 
blueprint for a streamlined NGO. Many of the case NGOs have narrowed their 
programmatic focus, expanded their activities into the Southern African region and 
subcontracted to government in recent years. Around the time of the second democratic 
election in 1999, South Africa also began to witness an eruption of mass protests and 
mobilisations expressing dissent over the government’s failures in service delivery.  
 
Broadening participation or extending partnerships? 
Intertwining national and global processes of professionalisation and homogenisation 
have produced as ideal-typical CSO a formal and streamlined NGO with cross-sectoral 
linkages. In the present study, the organisations that emerged as most successful in 
accessing donor funding in the spheres of civil-society strengthening and public 
participation were NGOs based in the three urban centres; they had professionalised and 
all had considerable quantitative-analytical skills. Being able to adhere to the stringent 
reporting requirements demanded by donors already implies a high level of financial, 
management and language expertise. The point to emphasise in relation to donor 
demands of monitoring and evaluation is their organisational-structural effects. Project 
evaluation and performance reviews overemphasise quantitatively measurable outcomes, 
therefore they are changing the ratio between financial/administrative and project staff, 
impacting on organisational culture and producing specific types of expertise. Monitoring 
and evaluation practices thus require certain organisational conditions which not only 
favour but indeed produce highly professionalised types of NGOs. 
In addition to favouring such types of organisations, donors delineate specific 
roles for CSOs, such as ‘partnering with government to improve the quantity and quality 
of basic services’ or ‘engaging in policy formulations’ (Charles Stewart Mott Foundation 
2007). The emphasis placed on partnering is central to a contemporary understanding of 
development that sees partnerships between civil society and the state as a means to 
deliver inclusively and efficiently. At the same time, the fact that many donors support 
the South African government via bilateral aid means that they shy away from supporting 
NGOs that work with social movements which may be seen as critical of government. 
The constantly shifting alliances in partnerships have severe implications for NGO 
accountabilities to their supposed constituencies. However, a simple argument of 
international donors putting into place the existing development regime does not capture 
the complexities of the South African non-profit sector for which the state is in fact the 
biggest donor. Civil-society-enhancing programmes continue to be constructed by 
external actors, but they overlap, and occasionally conflict, with other (for instance state-
led or community-based) versions of development. Many NGOs have themselves 
incorporated donors’ interpretations of their roles.  
The often internally divided relationships of NGOs with the state are further 
complicated not only by their involvement in partnerships, but also by their 
subcontracting for government as part of a drive for sustainability. A number of NGO 
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staff characterised their location as necessitating a constant tightrope walk. IDASA was 
said to have a ‘schizophrenic capacity to work in different ways with different people’.vii 
On the one hand, civil society should be a site for the production of discourses that can be 
critical of the state, especially in the context of high levels of poverty and inequality. 
Given that NGOs are tasked with building capacity for and extending civil society, they 
are assigned a critical role that goes beyond holding the state accountable. This is why a 
celebration of civil society’s plurality must be carefully formulated: NGOs working with 
other parts of civil society have a responsibility to strengthen these formations in their 
own abilities to advance dialogue and critique. On the other hand, collaboration with 
national government or provincial ministries on particular policies can impede their 
ability to exercise this twofold critical role. Service-related NGOs by definition are in 
more collegiate relationships with the government than many of the NGOs considered 
here that are working in the fields of human rights, advocacy or monitoring. 
Nevertheless, even for this set, assisting government and hence ‘contributing to change 
seriously’ can be an important aspect of their work.viii The dualism of supporting 
government in implementation whilst remaining in a critical watchdog role that holds 
government accountable is difficult to accomplish, especially given the state’s apparent 
definition, for much of the post-apartheid period, of appropriate state-civil society 
relations as collegiate and uncritical, and its branding of non-adherence as unpatriotic. 
This dilemma is particularly evident where NGOs’ perspective on popular movements is 
concerned, the latter of which have been subject to state marginalisation and repression 
for challenging government policies and its failures in service delivery. NGOs’ 
engagement with the state clearly affects their positioning towards other components of 
civil society.  
The link between expanding the public sphere and democratic growth is regularly 
evoked, but – as those involved in initiatives designed to stimulate public dialogue 
readily acknowledge – remains under-researched.ix Precisely because of this lack of 
evidence, it is important to question whether NGOs are the appropriate agents to engage 
those excluded from political processes and to encourage criticism of the narrowing of 
spaces for debate. After all, NGOs have for many years been criticised for frequently not 
reaching the marginalised, having little legitimacy with communities and having a 
specific base. Donor objectives of supporting a diverse civil society seem largely 
rhetorical where it is almost exclusively formal NGOs that qualify for funding intent on 
broadening public participation and strengthening civil society. The structural location of 
formal NGOs may result in donors supporting very particular interests and reproducing 
existing elites. Donors’ focus on NGOs could then be seen as limiting civil society and 
democratic participation, running the danger of ‘thwart[ing] the formation and 
effectiveness of interest groups that could push for state accountability’ (Howell and 
Pearce 2001, p. 185). With civil society itself being constructed, discursively and 
materially, according to often narrow donor criteria, its extension through capacity-
building projects can arguably result in more of the same civil society, as opposed to 
contributing to greater participation. 
 
NGOs and social movements 
 
From the public sphere to counterpublics 
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The fact that most funded NGOs may structurally not be in a position to forge critical 
debate then necessitates the question of which other civil society formations are able to 
open up such spaces. In particular, it is popular movements and their repression by the 
state that bring the relationships of NGOs towards non-elitist forms of participation and 
protest into sharp focus. South Africa now has the greatest number of protest actions in 
the world – 10,000 per year, according to some (Bond 2007c). The persistence of high 
levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality, resulting from the restructuring of the 
economy and the adoption of a cost-recovery model in service provision, have given rise 
to the upsurge of movements out of such protests. What are sometimes referred to as new 
social movements encompasses a whole array of issues and constituencies that vary 
considerably in scale, organisational form, capacity and strategies.x Whilst movements 
tend to be vociferous in their critique of the state, their positioning can be divergent, 
ranging from confrontation to partial engagement on specific issues. The differences 
between NGOs and movements are not in all instances clear-cut either, as was stated 
earlier: TAC, for example, bridges the space between NGO and movement, employing a 
range of tactics to hold the state accountable. Nonetheless, community movements are 
usually excluded from donors’ definition of civil society and the public sphere. Donor-
funded NGOs likewise struggle with defining their identity in relation to movements, as 
the next section of the article explores: whilst situating themselves in alliance with 
movements, their relationship is also characterised by attempts to contain or shape 
movements. 
To direct attention to social movements as potentially offering spaces for debate 
and critique requires briefly revisiting Habermas’s work on the public sphere. Whilst his 
analysis can provide a tool to understand the commercialisation of NGOs, more 
problematic for the present context is his assumption that social movements have shifted 
their attention from capital/labour struggles to grievances connected to the colonisation of 
the lifeworld by state and economy. This is difficult to uphold in the context of South 
African community mobilisations against the neoliberal reordering of the economy.xi 
Habermas’s thinking on the public sphere also falls short in this context because it 
assumes that a multiplicity of alternative public spheres indicates fragmentation and 
democratic decline. Nancy Fraser (2003), for instance, has shown that, in stratified 
societies, existing structural inequalities are exacerbated if there is only one single public 
sphere: members of subordinated groups have no spaces for deliberation among 
themselves, resulting in a danger of absorption into a comprehensive public sphere. Her 
concern certainly resonates with the stigmatising of public protests as seemingly 
constituting a betrayal of the national democratic revolution and of national democratic 
citizenship. The discourse of nation building as it is circulated by political elites is in fact 
central to this understanding of the public sphere as necessarily consensual and 
homogenous. Xolela Mangcu (2008) argues that nationalism, instead of being a tool in 
the struggle against repression, has become an instrument of rule. Based on the same 
logic is the inclusive vision of development and social change that is encapsulated in the 
contemporary emphasis on multisectoral partnerships. 
Conversely, Fraser’s concept of counterpublics captures the ‘plurality of 
competing publics’, providing spaces for subordinated groups to ‘invent and circulate 
counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests 
and needs’ (2003, p. 91). Her notion challenges the oft-criticised assumption that 
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members of the Habermasian public sphere are able to debate as equals, notwithstanding 
their economic or social status. In the context of post-apartheid South Africa, with its 
formally inclusive public sphere but historical structural relations of dominance and 
inequality, greater attention to discursive interactions and the rules governing inclusion 
and exclusion in public spaces is necessary. Support of formalised NGOs’ work for the 
purpose of widening democratic participation has to be carefully reassessed taking into 
account these concerns. Moreover, the ongoing attempts by certain sectors of government 
and other centres of power to contain critical voices present in the convened public 
sphere point to the essential role for counterpublics in South Africa. As sites enabling 
public deliberation, critique and active citizenship, social and community movements 
have the potential to act as counterpublic spheres.xii Turning now to NGO relations to 
movements, several positions are highlighted: whilst some cast movements as providing 
much-needed critical voices, there is also a tendency to draw these alternative spaces into 
a consensual civil society. 
 
Relationships of NGOs to movements  
A small set of NGOs, such as the FXI or Khanya College, has in recent years played a 
supportive role to movements by providing legal resources, training and publicity, or by 
building capacity.xiii The repression of protest by the state has defined such NGOs’ 
positioning.xiv Whilst NGOs may see themselves as supportive of the activities of social 
movements, the extent to which they are able to support them materially is dependent on 
their own funding modalities: ‘quite a few NGOs […] have shunned working with social 
movements because they don’t want to be tainted with the aura of radicalism’, as Jane 
Duncan, Executive Director of the FXI, put it.xv 
The majority of NGO staff felt that the appropriate relationship between their 
NGOs and movements should be one of ‘solidarity’ and ‘mutual respect’, yet the NGOs 
were not actively supporting movements. Similar to the first set of organisations, such 
NGOs understood the contribution of social movements to democracy as positive: social 
activism and protest are signs of the maturity of post-apartheid democracy. NGO 
accounts often drew on an idea of civil society as plural, depicting populist movements as 
the vanguard that demonstrates to NGOs their failure in challenging the status quo: 
‘[Social movements] have become that critical voice to say that’s the role you should 
have been playing. They just went and they did it. They just marched’.xvi Again, 
decisions not to support social movements despite pronouncements of solidarity may be 
motivated by concerns about their own funding.  
A perhaps surprisingly large number of NGO staff, consciously or unconsciously, 
distanced themselves from social movements. For instance, the contribution of social 
movements to democratic practice was praised in the abstract, but the strategies and 
tactics they employ were critiqued by the director of Agenda: 
 
You know, I have always worked at a grass roots level. So for me social movements are 
critical. And I think we as civil society organisations, as NGOs that might give you a 
different flavour from a social movement, I think there is a need for civil society 
organisations to put their weight and put their resources and thoughtfully move social 
movements to a place where it is much more credible.xvii 
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Commonalities with movements by virtue of shared values or politics were often evoked, 
for example by drawing on the reified ‘we’ of civil society. However, marching or 
‘burning the tyres outside’ loomed large in NGO narratives of community activism. This 
is appropriate in that one characteristic of post-apartheid movements is their high degree 
of popular participation. Yet, they cannot be reduced to it. In fact, many social 
movements have used a variety of strategies and have developed a ‘maturity around when 
to use the courts, when to use struggle-on-the-streets tactics, when to use publicity, and 
when to use all three together’, argues Jane Duncan.xviii 
Another way in which NGO staff distanced themselves from social movements 
was by pitting ‘constructive engagement’ with the state against ‘marching on the street’. 
Institutionalised politics, the media and the courts were in some interviews portrayed as 
the legitimate and proper channels through which policy can be impacted on in the 
democratic era. Conversely, mass mobilisation was portrayed as outdated, with the effect 
of it seemingly being no longer acceptable to use what was constructed as backward 
apartheid-era struggle tactics. This discursive opposition throws up interesting parallels to 
development discourses on modernity, progress and liberal democracy. It also resonates 
strongly with a dominant understanding of civil society as an arena for formal 
organisations suited to a liberal model of organising society. Besides establishing which 
means are appropriate to register protest, NGO accounts of social movement activity thus 
also work to define what a modern CSO should be. Others argued that whilst protest was 
justified given the lack of service delivery, social movements were simply not effective 
enough: ‘If you are going to engage with the major policy issues and try to shift the way 
your society operates, you are going to have to have organised forms of civil society. The 
best model would appear to be, at this stage, some kind of sensitive NGO’.xix NGO 
constructions of social movements resonate with the above-encountered donor 
understanding of civil society in that they envisage an organisation that mediates between 
communities and the state. The liberal tenet requires more and more civil society, but not 
the kind of civil society that social movements embody. The kind of organisation 
supposedly best suited to post-apartheid liberal democracy is an effective, efficient and 
formal NGO, staffed with ‘well-mannered activists who play by the rules, settle conflicts 
peacefully, and do not break any windows’, to cite one commentator (Carothers 1999 
cited Howell and Pearce 2001, p. 42). 
The following extract from an interview with the director of an NGO  that focuses 
on strengthening democracy through citizen participation and civil society promotion 
points further towards some of the politics underlying NGO relationships with 
movements: 
 
And we’ve offered them: if you want to use our training manuals here; if you want 
capacity building, having a workshop and sandwiches and stuff, we can provide that. And 
we have materials and manuals that you want to use, that’s fine […] But one of them 
came to me and said they’d smashed their car. And they came to us; you know what, can 
we get a car? I said no I can’t do that […] that is where we differ; I have to be completely 
accountable for how I spend the money of the organisation. It does not work like that. I 
said you also have to learn how these things operate.xx 
 
Holding the purse strings in a potential relationship does not just indicate a resource 
inequality that may or may not play itself out similarly to a classical donor-beneficiary 
relationship; the provision of training itself establishes particular practices and provides 
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access to communities and their immediate organisations.xxi As I implied above, the 
capacity-building role that many NGOs are sponsored to fulfil in civil society is itself 
problematic. Organisational development, one of the fields of activity for intermediary 
NGOs, may itself contribute to the restructuring of their civil society partners in line with 
a particular version of civil society. 
Whether supportive or critical of their work, wanting to ‘move social movements 
to a more credible place’ or the teleology characterising the above account of a meeting 
with members of Abahlali baseMjondolo betrays a sense of NGOs wanting to change 
social movements’ practices in line with their own version of civil society. Such 
‘reformism’ is a central issue in NGOs’ relations to social movements. This argument 
underlines how civil society practice is also defined by NGOs wanting to shape social 
movements in their own image, and highlights the potential for an NGO-isation of 
movements. In accessing funding or other resources, CSOs have to engage with a variety 
of bureaucratic questions arising from the need for accountability. The quantitative-
analytical skills required for reporting, monitoring and evaluation practices are one 
example. Moreover, once an NGO has entered into funding and monitoring regimes, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to work with less formalised organisations since these are 
not structurally equipped to prove results-based management or adhere to complicated 
reporting systems. As the director of an NGO that provides education and research for the 
labour and social movements put it: ‘we only work with the ones who do have a 
photocopying machine, who can account for all the money and so on’.xxii As a result, 
CSOs may become – in terms of activities and organisational structure – more like 
NGOs. In important ways, the professionalisation and formalisation of the NGO sector 
that were charted earlier translate to civil society more broadly.  
There is a parallel as well between NGO-isation and the processes of 
homogenisation that are the outcome of NGO partnerships with the public and private 
sectors. The expertise that NGO-isation produces is organisational, financial and 
managerial; the channels through which it is circulated are organisational practices and 
procedures that are connected to the responsibilisation of CSOs. Whilst NGO attempts at 
reforming movements may be purely discursive, they serve to define what civil society 
should be, thus marginalising certain forms of CSOs and contributing to a narrow 
definition of civil society. NGO-isation and NGO reformism have the potential of 
institutionalising community struggles over the meaning of development and democracy, 
thereby containing and civilising them. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the 
institutionalisation of movements is an incomplete project; there are constantly 
challenges to NGOs’ discourses and practices within civil society (cf. Li 2007).xxiii  
 
Conclusion 
This article has examined the idea that post-apartheid democracy can be deepened, and 
civil society strengthened, by NGO activities in the sphere of public debate and 
participation. I do not wish to imply that such activities are futile. On the contrary, the 
case NGOs are all committed to opening spaces for participation and critique. I have 
sought, however, to emphasise that the overwhelming focus of donors on NGOs as the 
only legitimate representative of civil society may in fact narrow spaces for critique by 
excluding CSOs that do not fit their criteria. A gap between donor rhetoric and funding 
practices was identified where a plural civil society is regarded as central to democratic 
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development, but in practice it is mainly formal and urban NGOs that are supported to 
carry out public-sphere-enhancing activities. This funding preference may well contribute 
to a homogenous and institutionalised public sphere, thus reinforcing societal elites and 
marginalising the majority population. NGOs increasingly acting as a development 
partner for government and the corporate sector further cast doubt on their ability to open 
up spaces for critical public debate and engagement as their involvement in multisectoral 
partnerships impacts on their positioning towards wider civil society.  
Whilst some NGO accounts celebrate the pluralism of civil society, I have asked 
whether the capacity-building activities of NGOs may not ultimately construct less 
professionalised components of civil society as something to be reformed and drawn into 
a circle of consensus. The danger here lies not only in a marginalisation of other CSOs, 
but also in the homogenisation of civil society through processes of NGO-isation. This 
certainly raises concerns over the institutionalisation of community struggles and the 
containment of counterpublic spheres. I have only tentatively indicated what the 
democratic deficit resulting from narrowly conceived notions of civil society and 
processes of NGO-isation may be. Nonetheless, the exclusion of less formal types of 
organisations runs a danger of excluding actors that could push for state accountability, 
where NGOs may be structurally unable to do so. Attention must be paid to the processes 
of governmentality by which NGOs themselves come to define and transfer what civil 
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 Notes 
   This article draws on data gathered from interviews with directors or senior staff of NGOs. 
Clearly, these do not necessarily represent the often divided opinions within their organisations on key 
questions of location and identity. 
ii  There is considerable discussion about what is included and excluded in civil society, and 
particularly whether the economy should be included in the definition of civil society. See G. Edwards 
(2004) and Elliott (2003) for overviews of the debate. 
iii  See, for example, the Mott Foundation, Ford Foundation and the UK Department for International 
Development (DfID), as well as a number of Northern NGOs that act as grant makers in South Africa. 
iv  There are also academic institutions whose public lectures and research programmes seek to 
foster debate and bridge the gap between communities and academia but which do not fit the description of 
NGO as I employ it here. Many of the case NGOs are also involved in capacity-building initiatives with 
local or community-based organisations as a way of extending civil society and strengthening democracy. 
v  As I indicated in the introduction, the NGOs sampled for this research are what I have chosen to 
call intermediary organisations, rather than straightforward service-delivery NGOs providing welfare to the 
population. 
vi  The term Post-Washington Consensus describes the shift in economic thinking and development 
policy, in the last decade, towards recognising the centrality of institutions and social factors in the efficient 
functioning of markets.  
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vii  Interview with R. Calland, Director, Governance Programme, IDASA, 23 Apr 2007. 
viii  Interview with A. Motala, Executive Director, CSVR, 4 May 2007. 
ix  Interview with T. Bailey, National Coordinator, Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust, 25 Apr 2007 
x  See, for example, the edited volume by Ballard et al. (2006), which contains chapters on the 
Landless People’s Movement, the Concerned Citizens Forum, the TAC, the Anti-Privatisation Forum and 
other movements.  
xi  For reasons of space, it is not possible to discuss the critiques of Habermas’s original account, 
such as his exclusion of women and workers. Rather, this section is concerned with reconceptualisations of 
his account as they may apply to the politics of civil-society sponsoring in South Africa. 
xii  Whilst it is not implied that every protest action is indicative of public debate or the existence of 
emancipatory public spaces, social movements continue to formulate alternative policies and approaches to 
development, democracy, the state, etc. 
xiii  There are other donor-funded organisations that are aligned with, or supportive of, social 
movements, such as the University of KwaZulu Natal’s Centre for Civil Society, SAHA, International 
Labour Research and Information Group or the Alternative Information Development Centre. Some of 
these reject the characterisation as an NGO, others are academic research centres and therefore not included 
in this analysis.  Conversely, some international NGOs also support relatively more formalised 
movements such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) or the TAC. This article is not concerned with 
NGO-social movement relations, although a shift in terms of how such organisations conceive of popular 
movements has taken place in recent years (personal conversation with D. McKinley, Anti-Privatisation 
Forum, 11 Jul 2007). 
xiv  Following the mobilisations around the World Conference against Racism and the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in 2001 and 2002, respectively, the government started to ban gatherings and 
repress movements – sparking new struggles and increasing support for existing movements. These events 
represented the first very public rejection of the ANC and its economic policies and also signified 
collective national action of previously highly localised community struggles (Desai 2002). They are 
noteworthy also because they marked a defining point in terms of repositioning the relationships between 
some of the movements and NGOs, with a small set of progressive NGOs and donors now beginning to 
support these movements (interview with J. Duncan, 30 Mar 2007). 
xv  Interview with J. Duncan, Director, FXI, 30 Mar 2007. 
xvi  Interview with anonymous NGO director, 25 Jun 2007. 
xvii  Interview with M. Oyedan, Director, Agenda, 27 Jun 2007. 
xviii  Interview with J. Duncan, 30 Mar 2007. 
xix  Interview with W. Bird, Director, Media Monitoring Africa, 13 Jun 2007. 
xx  Interview with anonymous NGO director, 25 Jun 2007. 
xxi  However, it is important to note that rather than seeking funding or collaborations with NGOs, 
those movements that come from an autonomist tradition would reject funding from NGOs or other donors 
or NGOs outright. 
xxii  Interview with L. Gentle, Director, ILRIG, 24 Apr 2007. 
xxiii  An analysis of social movements’ understanding of NGOs would clearly yield quite different 
results which go beyond the scope of this article. Far from seeking relationships with NGOs, some 
movements come from a strong autonomist tradition and would reject funding from donors or NGOs 
outright (such as the Western Cape Eviction Campaign). Other movements, such as the APF, receive some 
funding from NGOs, work with them on a number of clearly specified projects, but likewise do not see a 
natural connection or political alliance with them – their relationship is at best a ‘tactical temporary 
alliance’ (personal conversation with D. McKinley, 11 Jul 2007).  Many contemporary movements in 
South Africa have theorised their ideas of development and democracy in opposition to NGOs (including 
left NGOs). Richard Pithouse, for instance, writes about Abahlali that it has been driven by a commitment 
to intellectual autonomy from its beginnings, further noting that ‘[r]ival state and NGO vanguards have 
responded to the emergence of a politics of the poor with strikingly similar paranoia and authoritarianism’ 
(2008, p. 86; also see Gibson 2008). Conversely, some NGO leaders are acutely aware of the danger of 
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